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ABSTRACT
This article tests for asymmetry in thebehavior ofbank lending rates by testing the hypothesisthat
the prime rateresponds more fully and quickly to increase than decreases in market interest rates.
The econometric methodology used is better suited to the discreteness and rigidity of the prime
rate than that of previous studies. Our results suggest that banks adjust the prime rate
asymmetrically in response to change in the discount rate, the commercial paper rate, and the
spread between the prime and commercial paper rates. Asymmetry in bank lending rates is
implied by several explanations for the preference among small firms for internal finance.
Asymmetry in bank lending rates may result from the fact that individual banks have acquired
costly information which prevents their customers from responding quickly to changes in loan
terms, or it may stem from acyclical “lemons” premium resulting from informational asymmetries
[Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)]. Either way, asymmetric behavior ofbank lending rates, such as
theprime rate, may be part ofa more complete explanationof small firms’ preference for internal
finance.
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St. Louis, MO 63102 St. Louis, MO 63102Many analysts believe that banks adjust their lending rates more slowly
when interestrate are falling than when they are rising. As evidence of such
behavior, they point to the apparent sluggishness in banks’ adjustment of the
prime lending rate to declining market rates. Asymmetry ofthe prime rate is
often viewed as a matter of curiosity and perhaps an indicator of the market
power of banks. However, we believe that evidence of asymmetry in the prime
rate supports recent explanations of a financing hierarchy, where firms turn to
external finance only after exhausting their internal funds.
If bank lending rates rise rapidly when market interest rates are rising, yet
decline sluggishly when market interest rates are falling, firms may prefer in-
ternal finance because the opportunity cost of internal funds moves in tandem
with market rates. Because many smaller medium size firms are dependent on
banks for external finance, evidence that the premium for external, bank finance
rises when interest rates are fatling would provide at least a partial explanation
for documented differences [e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988); Gertler
and Gitchrist (1991, 1992a,b); Gitchrist (1990); Gilchrist and Himmetberg (1990);
Otiner and Rudebusch (1992); and Whited (1992), Calomiris and Hubbard
(1993)] in the investment behavior of small and large firms.1
1Theinvestment behaviorof small firms has received considerable attention as
analysts have attempted to verify whethera “creditcrunch” contributed significantly
to the 1990-91 recession [e.g., Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Morgan (1992)].
Stories of credit-constrained firms have also renewed interest in the “credit
1Asymmetry in the prime rate may also have implications for the efficacy
of monetary policy. In particular, it could help explain why Cover (1992) and
Rotemberg (1993) conclude that easy monetary policy is less expansionary than
restrictive monetary policy is contractionary. During periods of fatling interest
rates, downwardly sluggish bank lending rates would dampen the stimulus that
monetary policy could provide to investmentspending, whereas in periods of
rising interest rates, bank tending rates would generally increase in tandem with
market rates.
Despite the widespread belief that the prime rate adjusts more slowly
when interest rates are falling, evidence of asymmetry inthe prime has been
mixed. Arak, Englander and Tang (1984) and Levine and Loeb (1983) find
evidence ofasymmetric price-sethng behavior, while Gotdberger (1984) and
Forbes and Mayne (1989) find little evidence of asymmetric pricing behavior.
Previous findings should be interpreted cautiously, however, because none of
the previous research used a methodology that accounts for both rigidity in the
prime and the discrete nature of its changes. In addition, none of the previous
research has allowed for the possibility that banks respond to pressures
exerted when the Federal Reserve changes its discount rate. That changes in
the discount rate may be important to explaining the behavior of the prime rate
is supported by Hendry (1992), who found changes in the Bank of Canada’s
channel” of monetary policy [e.g., Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap, Stein
and Wilcox (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1993)].
2Bank Rate to be the most important variable in explaining changes in the
Canadian prime rate.2
We test for asymmetry in the setting of the prime rate by allowing the
prime rate to respond differently to increases and decreases in the commercial
paper rate, the discount rate and changes in the spread between the
commercial paper and prime rates and between the federal funds and discount
rates. We allow for asymmetry in both the degree to which banks respond to
changes in rates and rate spreads and the speed with which they respond.
Our results suggest considerable asymmetry in the response of the prime rate
to changes in the discount rate and market interest rates. Generally speaking,
there is evidence of asymmetry in both the degree and the speed of the
response.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIME RATE
AND SOURCES OF ASYMMETRY
The prime rate is considered the rate banks charge their most
creditworthy customers. The importance of the prime rate has been questioned
because banks make loans at rates below their prime. Nevertheless, the
Federal Reserve’s survey ofterms of lending of commercial banks, shown in
Figure 1, shows that asignificant proportion of bank loans are made at rates at
or above the prime rate. In addition, while there has been a downward trend in
2Thornton (1986) also showed that the prime rate appears to have adjusted
fairly rapidly to changes in the discount rate duringthe period from the fall of 1982
to the spring of 1986.
3the proportion of short-term business loan made at rates at or above the prime
rate during the last decade, there has been little change in the proportion of
long-term business loan made at prime.
James (1982) has argued that indexing loan rates to the prime rate
minimizes the moral hazard potential of opportunistic price selling by banks. If
lending rates are indexed to the prime rate, asymmetry in the behavior of the
prime rate implies asymmetry in the behavior of other lending rates — even
loans that are not explicitly tied to the prime. The prime rate may also serve as
a benchmark against which many firms assess their own credit worthiness.
Asymmetric price setting can stem from information asymmetries.3 For
example, banks specialize in acquiring costly information about their business
customers. Consequently, some firms will find it difficult to switch quickly from
a lender who knows them to a lender who does not if their present lender were
hesitant to reduce its lending rate in responseto decreases in market rates.
Knowing this, banks might adjust their lending rates more slowly in response to
decreases in market rates than to increases. While potentially valid, Rajan
(1992) has argued that such opportunistic behavior may not fitinto a bank’s
optimal longer-run cooperative strategy.
3Asymmetry in the prime rate is sometimes attributed to banks possessing
market power. Marketpower only implies that the prime rate will react sluggishly
or incompletely to changes in market interest rates, it cannot account for
asymmetric behavior [see Hannan (1991)].
4Asymmetric price setting may also stem from information asymmetries
that give rise to a lemons premium [Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)1. In cyclical
downturns, for example, market interest rates tend to decline as credit demand
falls. Recognizing that small firms generally have higher and more cyclical
probabilities of failure than large firms, financial markets may require a larger
risk premium on loans to small firms during periods of declining interest rates.4
Banks may extract this premium by lowering their lending rates relatively slowly
during periods of declining market rates.
II. MODELING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PRIME RATE
The empirical work presented here consists of modelling the prime rate
as a function of variables which might cause money-center banks to adjust their
prime rate. The ordered probit model is used because weekly changes in the
prime rate occur infrequently and have taken on only eleven values, from minus
200 basis points to pIus 150 basis points. While other models [e.g., Forbes
and Mayne (1989)] account for the rigidity ofthe prime rate, the ordered probit
model accounts for its rigidity and for the discrete nature of prime rate
changes.5
4For evidence ofthis, see Slovin, Sushka and Poloncheck (1993).
5The multinominallogit is another model whichcould capture discreteness and
rigidity, but itwould impose an independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
that is undesirable for prime rate changes. The odds of a 100 basispoint increase
in the prime, relative to a 25 basis point increase, should not be invariant to
different values of the probability of 100 basis point decrease in the prime.
5The ordered probit model evaluates the probabilities of different-sized
changes in the prime rate as functions of explanatory variables X:
Prob(APrime < -1) = ~(X~) (1)
Prob(LtPrime = -.5) = ~(X~3 +c1) -~ (Xf3) (2)
Prob(LtPrime = -.25) = ~ (Xf3 +c,j-~ (X13+c~) (3)
Prob(APrime = 0) = ~(X~ +c3)-~ (X~ +c2) (4)
Prob(APrime = .25) = ~(Xf3+c4)-~(X13+c.~~ (5)
Prob(APrime .5) = 1 (X~3 +c~) -~ (X13 +c4) (6)
Prob(A Prime = .75) = ‘1 (Xf3+c~) -~ (X~ +c~) (7)
Prob(APrime 1.0) = 1-Z(Xf3+c~) (8)
cp() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and X is aTby K
matrix of the determinants of prime rate change andfi is a K by I vector of
unknown parameters. The coefficients c~ are ordered in that c6 > c5 > ... > c1,
so that the cumulative probability increases monotonically going from the
6smallest to the largest change. Estimates of /3 show how the probabilities of
prime rate changes vary with different values of the explanatory variables.
Almost any degree of rigidity can be parameterized within the ordered probit
framework. The rigidity of the prime rate is captured by the difference between
the estimates of c3 and c2. Ifthis difference is large, the probability of no
change in the prime rate will be high. Exceptions occur when Xfl is unusually
large in absolute value: alarge positive value of X,8 means that the prime is
likely to decrease; large negative values imply that an increase is likely.
Defining Z~ = 1 if y~ (the change in the prime) is in categoryj and zero
otherwise and also setting c~= -co, c0=0 and c7= co, the log-likelihood to be
madmized is
logL = ~ Z~log(~(c1+x~)-I(c~1+xf3)]. (9)
Pratt (1981) shows that the log-likelihood function is globally concave as a
function of the parameters, so any non-linear maximization algorithm will
converge to the global maximum.
Ill. DATA AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
The model is estimated using weekly (Friday-to-Friday) changes in the
prime rate for the period from the week ending January 5, 1973 to the week
ending February 5, 1993. The frequency distribution of weekly changes in the
prime rate is presented in Table 1. A non-zero change in the prime rate took
7place in about 20 percent of the weeks. While there were more prime rate
increases than decreases, the average change in the prime was exactly zero
over the period.
The explanatory variables, all of which are lagged and expressed in
percentage changes, include: the weekly change in the discount and 90-day
commercial paper rates and weekly changes in the spreads between the prime
rate and the 90-day commercial paper rate and between the federal funds rate
and the discount rate.6
Changes in all of the variables are partitioned into positive and negative
changes to test for asymmetry in the sethng of the prime rate. The estimated
coefficients on both positive and negative changes in all variables should have
the same sign. For example, the coefficient on the change in the discount rate
should be negative, because an increase in the discount rate should reduce X,8
and thereby reduce the probability of a cut in the prime rate. Likewise, a
decrease should increase X,8 and the probability of a cut in the prime rate.
°Followingprevious research, we originally specified the model using the rate
spreads rather than the first-difference of the rate spreads. This led to
considerable persistence in the estimates of the expected changes in the prime
rate. When the first-differences of the spreads were used the log likelihood
function changes little, but the persistence in the forecasts was eliminated. It
appears that the near unit root processes that characterize the rate spreads (the
estimated roots were .989 and .950 for the prime rate-commercial paper rate
spread and the federal funds-discount rate spread, respectively) spilled over into
the forecasts ofthe expected change in the prime rate.
Inaddition, wealsoexperimentedwiththe spread betweenthe federalfunds
rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. This spread provided littleexplanatory power, so
it is not included in the results reported here.
8Evidence of asymmetry in the response of the prime rate to changes in the
discount rate is obtained by testing for equality of coefficients across increases
and decreases in the discount rate. The asymmetry hypothesis asserts that the
absolute value of the coefficient on increases is larger than that on decreases.
Changes in the discount rate tend to lag changes in market rates,
including the federal funds rate. If the funds rate falls relative to the discount
rate, the probability ofcuts in both the discount and prime rates should
increase. The opposite change is implied if the funds rate increases relative to
the discount rate. Consequently, the coefficient on the change in the spread
between the federal funds and discount rates should be negativefor both
increases and decreases in the rate spread. This relationship ought to hold
even at times when the Fed does not actually change the discount rate, so
including the rate spread along with changes in the discount rate should
enhance the model’s ability to predict changes in the prime rate.
The coefficient on changes in the commercial paperrate should be
negative: an increase in the commercial paper rate should decrease the
probability of acut in the prime rate. Because much previous research has
included the spread between the prime and the commercial paper rate, we also
included changes in this spread. A narrowing of the prime-commercial paper
spread should increase the probability of an increase in the prime rate, so the
coefficient on this rate spread should be positive.
9To gauge the speed with which banks adjust the prime rate to changes
in the explanatory variables, distributed lags of each of these variables were
included. The model uses a sixth-order distributed lag of both increases and
decreases in the discount rate and a fourth-order distributed lag for increases
and decreases in all of the other variables.7 Since we are primarily interested
in the total effect ofthe explanatory variables on the probability of a prime rate
change, it is convenient to re-parameterize the k-order distributed lag as
~(L)X~1 ~ —r(L)AX~1, (10)
where /3(L) and 1(L) are the usual polynomial lag operators, p = fl~ ++ fi~
and 1~ = 82 + ... + /3k’ 12 = 83 + ... + fl~, etc. The relative speed at which
banks respond to changes in the commercial paper and discount rates can be
obtained by examining how rapidly the estimated coefficients converge to p.
IV. THE ESTIMATES
Since it is well established [e.g., Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Cook and
Hahn (1988) and Thornton (1986, 1994)] that market interest rates do not
respond to technical discount rate changes, i.e., changes made solely to keep
the discount rate in line with market interest rates, initially the model was
specified with discount rate increases and decreases partitioned into technical
7Because the number ofcombinations would be prohibitively large, all possible
models with lag lengths less than or equal to some maximum lag length were not
estimated to select the “optimal” lag length by a formal model selection criterion,
such as Akaike or Schwartz. Instead, some very limited experimentation was
undertaken using likelihood ratio tests for the significance of additional lags for
each explanatory variable separately.
10and all other or non-technical changes. The null hypothesis that the coefficients
for technical and non-technical discount rate changes are equal could not be
rejected at any reasonable significance level.8 Hence, the distinction between
technical and non-technical discount rate changes, which is critical for the
reaction of market interest rates to changes in the discount rate, does not
appear to be important for the response of the administered prime rate. It may
be that both non-technical and technical discount rate changes provide with
similar information about the level ofthe interest rates. Non-technical discount
rate changes portend a changein the level of interest rates, while technical
changes in some sense ratify changes that have already taken place. Hence,
discount rate increases provide banks with additionaljustification for raising their
lending rates and discount rate cuts provide downward pressure on lending
rates.
Figure 2 shows the actual weekly changes in the prime and the
expected change in the prime from the model. Interestingly, the model appears
to predict weekly changes best when interest rate volatility is high. This
impression is confirmed by a comparison of cumulative actual and expected
changes in the prime rate for various subperiods presented in Table 2. During
the period from October 5, 1979 to September 24, 1982 the cumulative
expected change in the prime was 0.261, nearly identical to the actual
cumulative change of zero. In contrast, the model cumulatively underpredicts
8The chi-square statistic, with 12 degrees of freedom, was 8.57.
11absolute changes in the prime rate for periods of low interest rate volatility
before and after this period. Consistent with the conventional wisdom it
appearsthat banks have been reluctant, relative to past behavior, to reduce the
prime rate in the last recession and recovery. The model cumulatively
overpredicts the decline in the prime rate since late 1990.
The perception of considerable inertia in the prime rate from Figure 2 is
confirmed by estimates ofthe constant terms presented in Table 3. The inertia
of.the prime rate is reflected in the large estimated difference between c3 and
c2. The gap between these two constants is more than four times larger than
between any other adjacent constants. This difference impHes that the
explanatory variables must have relatively extreme values before the
probabilities of prime rate changes (other than zero) are very high. ~This likely
accounts for the model’s better performance during periods of high interest rate
volatility.9
Care must be exercised in interpreting the coefficients in a ordered probit
model, because the odds of a decrease versus the odds of an increase in the
prime rate is not symmetricabout the mean of X,8 due to the effects of c1,..., C8.
Hence, in reporting the results of an ordered probit model, it is useful to report
°Themodel was also estimated by weighting the first difference in the
explanatory variables by their standard deviations over various subperiods. The
performance of the model was worse than when percentage changes were used
and the model with percentage changes performed onlymarginally betterthan the
model that simply used first differences of levels. These experiments tend to
support the notion that there is considerable inertia in the prime rate.
12the effect of a change in X/3 on probabilities of the eight possible changes in the
prime rate when X is evaluated at the sample mean. The signs of these
derivatives, presented in Table 4, showthat the shift in probability mass is
precisely from positive to non-positive changes as X,8 increases away from its
mean.
Generally, the estimated coefficients presented in Table 3 provide strong
support for asymmetry in the prime rate. As expected, the initial coefficient, ~
and the sum of the coefficients, p, are negative for both increases and
decreases in the discount rate. Consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis,
however, only the coefficients on increases are statisticallysignificant atthe 5
percent level. Moreover, the absolute values offl~ and p are larger for discount
rate increases than decreases. Table 5 presents formal tests ofthe equalityof
various parameters for increases and decreases in the rates and rate spreads.
The null hypothesis of equality is rejected at the 5 percent level or less for all
the coefficients except fl~.The lack of significance of this test is not very
important, given that the estimate offl~ for decreases was not significantly
different from zero. Hence, the evidence suggests asymmetry in the response
of the prime rate to changes in the discount rate. Moreover, the point estimates
suggest asymmetry in the speed of response as well.
The results for the response of the prime rate to increases and
decreases in the commercial paper rate also point to asymmetry. Increases in
the commercial paper rate generate larger responses in the prime rate than
13decreases, as indicated by the absolute values of p,fl~ and 1~.Moreover, the
absolute magnitude coefficient p is significantly larger for increases than
decreases. Hence, there is evidence of asymmetry in the magnitude of the
response to changes in the commercial paper rate. The fact that the null
hypothesis thatfl~ is zero is rejected atthe 10 percent significance level for
increases in the commercial paper rate, but not at any reasonable significance
level for decreases inthe commercial paper rate also suggests asymmetry in
the speed of response. Nevertheless, these conclusions must be tempered by
the model’s failure to reject the hypothesis of the equality of all the coefficients
for increases and decreases in the commercial paper rate.
There is no strong evidence of asymmetric behavior of the prime rate in
response to changes in the spread between the federal funds rate and the
discount rate. The coefficientp is negative for both increases and decreases in
the rate spread, as anticipated, and both are statistically significant at a 5
percent significance level when tested against the one-tailed alternative. The
difference between these coefficients is not statistically significant, however.
The coefficientfl~ is negative and statistically significant only for decreases,
suggesting that the prime rate will respond more quickly to decreases than
increases in the spread between the federal funds and discount rates. The
interpretation of these coefficients must be tempered by the factthat the null
hypothesisthat all of the coefficients are equal cannot be rejected.
14The response of the prime rate to changes in the prime rate-commercial
paper rate spread also provides some evidence of asymmetry. The initial
coefficient,fl~, is highly significant for increases, but not statistically significant
for decreases. Moreover, the difference is statistically significant. The factthat
neitherthe estimate ofp nor 1~ is statistically significant for increases suggests
that the prime rate responses rapidly to changes in the rate spread.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We examine weeklychanges in the prime rate and find evidence that the
prime rate responds asymmetricallyto changes in the commercial paper rate,
the Federal Reserve’s discount rate and the spread between the prime rate and
the commercial paper rate. The strongest evidence of asymmetric behavior is
in the response of banks to changes in the discount rate. Banks respond
strongly and quickly to increases in the discount rate, but not decreases.
Moreover, banks respond to changes in the discount rate whether such
changes stimulate changes in market interest rates or merely ratify recent shifts
in market interest rates.
While we are not certain why bank lending rates respond asymmetrically,
it seems likely that informational asymmetries lead to a countercyclical risk
premium on bank loans to reflect the cyclical default and failure probabilities of
small firms. Banks collect the larger risk premia by lowering their lending rates
slowly, relative to market rates, during cyclical downturns.
15Whatever its source, asymmetry in bank lending rates might be an
important factor behind the apparent preference of small firms for internal
finance, in that, with the asymmetry, the relative cost of bank finance rises when
interest rates are falling. Hence, our results bolster existing explanations as to
whysome firms that have direct access to financial markets might eschew bank
finance, and why bank-dependent firms might rely heavily on internal finance.
In addition, the finding that the cost of external funds, relative to the
opportunity costof internal funds, may be countercyclical lends support to the
Fazzari and Peterson (1993) hypothesis that firms use inventories of working
capitalto smooth out the effect ofcyclical variations in the flow of internal funds
available to finance fixed investment. Moreover, asymmetry in bank lending
rates may account for some of the recently documented asymmetry inthe
effects of monetary policy. The extent to which asymmetry in bank lending
rates contributes to any of these observations is the subject of further research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
for Prime Rate Changes
Mean 0.00 Variance .054
Table 2
Cumulative Change and Expected Cumulative





12/07/90-02/05/93 -4.0000 -5.0407Table 3
Estimates from the Ordered Probit Model of Changes in the Prime Rate:




Intercept -3.691 .259 .0001








f3~ -13.169 3.979 .0009
p -36.191 11.609 .0018
r1 -23.020 10.244 .0246
Discount Rate
(Decrease)
fi~ -5.731 3.547 .1061
p -3.413 10.551 .7463




fl1 -7.485 4.520 .0978
~L 55.545 8.834~ .0001




/3~ -1.457 4.828 .7613
P 34.974 9.336 .0002







- .079 .041 .0527
r1






- .046 .019 .0161
IL - .121 .044 .0060
r1





j9~ .174 .046 .0002
P .069 .088 .4334
r1







- .159 .082 .0535
r1
- .191 .073 .0082
Note: P-values are for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis that the
coefficient is zero against the non-zero alternative.Table 4
Shift in Probability Mass from a Change in X~9
Size of Change in Prime Rate
Effect of an Increase in X~
on Probability of Prime Rate
Change (Variables evaluated










Tests for Asymmetry in the Prime Rate










































Note: P-values are in parentheses. The tests for symmetry
across increases and decreases for p, ~ and -y are one-tailed
t-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on
increases and decreases are equal against the null hypothesis
that absolute response is larger for increases than for
decreases. The test statistic for equality across all fi
coefficients is chi-squared with four degrees of freedom (six
for discount rate changes).Figure 1
Percentage of short• and long~term (greater than one year) business
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Fit of Ordered Probit Model Of Prime Rate
Weekly Change in Prime Rate
1
2/16/73 1/17/75 12/17/76 11/17/78 10/17/80 9/17/82 8/17/84 7/18/86 6/17/88 5/18/90 4/17/92